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Introduction
Competitions for internal promotions in companies or organizations often involve situations where one competitor observes how other competitors have performed at an interim stage before the competition is over. Such dynamic competitive settings may put psychological pressure on competitors who feel that they have to react to the performance of their rivals.
The pressure may, consequently, have an influence on a competitor's performance, thus possibly generating a first-mover advantage. This means that first-movers might win the competition more often because the performance of second-movers was negatively affected by psychological pressure, despite a priori equal probabilities of winning. Similar effects could arise in R&D races between companies, political elections or student competitions in school when interim information about the competitors' performance is released in the course of the competition (through preliminary research reports, election polls, or intermediate exams). Measuring the potential influence of psychological pressure in the field is a demanding task, because naturally occurring situations, for instance in companies, are typically too complex to allow for causal inferences. Furthermore, the precise identification of the effect calls for the randomized assignment of agents to the sequence of performing a task (in order to avoid endogeneity problems).
One remedy is the use of sports contests as a source of excellent data.
1 Such data provide a formidable framework for studying the impact of psychological pressure on performance in competitive environments, because they often involve explicit randomization. Moreover, decisions are taken or effort is provided by highly-paid professionals in their naturally occurring environment. A further advantage of sports data comes from often unambiguous measures for performance (like scoring a goal or not) and the one-dimensionality of the task (like kicking a ball or shooting a puck).
A recent paper by Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta (2010; abbreviated as APH in the following) has used data from a sports contest to examine the importance of psychological pressure in sequential tournaments. In particular, they have looked at soccer penalty shootouts where two teams, in alternating order, kick directly from the penalty mark to score a goal.
Since 1970, such shootouts have been used to determine the winner of a tied match for which a winner is needed to determine the team that advances to the next round of a knock-out tournament. Before July 2003, soccer penalty shootouts fulfilled the criterion of a randomized natural experiment (Harrison and List, 2004) , because the order of the kicks was decided by the toss of a coin, where the team that won the toss had to take the first kick. APH have collected data from 129 shootouts, finding that in these shootouts the first-kicking team won in 78 cases (60.5%) and the second-kicking team in only 51 cases (39.5%; see APH's Figure   1 ). Hence -despite an a priori winning probability of 50% for both teams -the first-kicking team had a significant margin of 21 percentage points over the second-kicking team in their data. APH conclude from their evidence that the "results provide support for a source of psychological pressure that has a detrimental effect on performance, and that is different from others such as high stakes, social pressure or peer pressure previously documented in the literature" (2010, p. 2563).
The striking findings of APH are at odds with the results of a couple of related studies, however. Kocher, Lenz and Sutter (2008) possible to analyze the data of other naturally occurring sequential contests than the ones studied so far or to conduct more (field) experiments. Second, one could extend the small sample of the APH-paper that is the only empirical paper so far that provides evidence for a significant first-mover advantage in sequential tournaments. It is exactly the latter strategy that we follow in this paper.
More specifically, we extended the initial sample of 129 shootouts of APH to 540 shootouts. Our sample is a strict superset of APH's data, using the same set of soccer tournaments. In contrast to their study that selects games unsystematically from a set of tournaments we have almost the full population of games with penalty shootouts from the set of tournaments used by APH. This larger sample allows us to re-examine the evidence and address the robustness of the alleged first-mover advantage in sequential tournaments.
Our data show that first-kicking teams win in 288 cases (53.3%). While this figure is slightly above 50%, it is far from being significantly so, neither in a two-sided binomial test, nor in a regression that controls for several potentially relevant covariates. Hence, we fail to find a significant first-mover advantage in a dataset that is a strict superset of APH's data and has more than fourfold the size. We discuss why our findings and those of APH are different, revealing that issues of data selection are important for understanding the discrepancies. In a nutshell, our results indicate that sequential tournaments do not seem to be significantly affected by psychological pressure, or, to say the least, they are much less affected than the paper by APH suggests.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the data and the rules that determine which team kicks first in a penalty shootout and how the outcome of a shootout is determined. Section 3 presents, first, our main results and, second, how our dataset relates to the one used by APH. Section 4 concludes the paper.
Rules and Data
Penalty shootouts were introduced by the world governing body of soccer, the Fédération
Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) in 1970 to determine the winner in knock-out tournament games in which there was a tie between two teams after 90 minutes of regular time and 30 minutes of overtime. Before 1970, the winner in tied games in a knock-out tournament was determined by the draw of a lot or a replay.
The basic rules for a penalty shootout are as follows (for details of the current rules see the official "Rules of the Game" at www.fifa.com): First, each team selects five players (out of the players on the pitch in the 120 th minute). Second, teams kick in alternating order. Third, the shootout is terminated as soon as the number of penalties converted by one team cannot be matched by the other team even if the other team would convert all their remaining penalties.
If -after both teams have taken five kicks -both have scored the same number of goals, teams continue kicking in the same alternating order until one team has scored one goal more than the other from the same number of kicks (i.e., in a sequential one-on-one competition).
Each penalty kick during the shootout must be taken by a different player, and all eligible players must have taken a kick before any player can take a second kick. In principle, this sequence can go on infinitely. However, the longest shootout in our dataset includes 26 kicks,
i.e., 13 for each team. Levitt and Groseclose, 2002) . Consequently, soccer players -because of their penalty shooting experience -have been used to examine mixed strategy play of professionals in the laboratory, yielding mixed evidence, however (see Palacios-Huerta and Volij, 2008 , versus Levitt, List and Reiley, 2010 , and Wooders, 2010 failing to identify a significant first-mover advantage.
Our result remains unchanged when applying a probit regression that controls for covariates such as whether a team is the home team ("home") or whether the match was staged on neutral ground ("neutral"). Table 2 presents the regression results, again indicating that the dummy for the first-kicking team is not significant (p = 0.15).
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Reasons for the different results -remarks on data selection
Even though our data set of 540 shootouts represent 76.2% of all shootouts from 1970 to 2003 in the tournaments considered (compared to the 18.2% of the APH-sample), we fail to find a significant first-mover advantage. One reason for the discrepancy in results between the two studies could have to do with different data collection methodologies. As becomes clear from their Table 1 , APH (2010, p. 2552) select subsamples of shootouts in the various tournaments, covering different time periods. More precisely, while APH take into account (almost) all shootouts in tournaments of national teams, the time periods that they choose for the various club tournaments seem to lack a systematic pattern and a clear rule for inclusion. We notice ups and downs in Figure 2 , but no systematic pattern in either direction over time.
According to Binomial tests, the relative winning frequency of first-kicking teams in a shootout is not significantly different from 50% in any single season.
Given the evidence so far, it seems that sampling issues can explain the different results and conclusions of the paper by APH and this paper. As a final exercise to demonstrate the consequences and importance of sampling, we calculate the probability with which one would get at least 60.5% of first-kicking teams winning in a sample of 129 shootouts if one sampled randomly from our dataset of 540 shootouts. Since our dataset is a strict superset of APH's dataset, this is equivalent to asking the question of how likely it is to get their results under the assumption that our data were considered the true population of shootouts from which APH sampled. This likelihood is p = 0.03. It is also noteworthy that if we split our dataset into APH's data (N = 129; 60.5% winning percentage of first-kicking teams) and the Rest (N = 411; 51.1% winning percentage of first-kicking teams), we find that APH's subset is noticeably different from the Rest (p < 0.08; ²-test). Of course, our dataset "only" covers 76.2% of the entire population of shootouts in the eleven tournaments. Hence, in a final step we imagine a scenario in which the true relative frequency of first-kicking teams winning a shootout would be the one found in APH, i.e., 60.5% in the whole population of the 709 shootouts that ever took place from 1970 to June 2003 in the eleven tournaments. Under this assumption, we can calculate the probability with which one would get at most 53.3% of firstkicking teams winning in a subsample of 540 shootouts (i.e., in our subsample given our main result). This probability is p = 3*10 -13
.
Finally, we have also compared our data set with the one of APH that can be downloaded on the website of the American Economic Review game by game. For the 129 shootouts that they use we find 21 inconsistencies between the two data sets. We have double-checked our sources and could not resolve the issue. Assuming that our sources are correct and using this data, the size of the first-mover advantage reported in the APH-paper is reduced considerably and, most importantly, turns insignificant. This is in line with the results in this paper for the much larger data set.
a penalty shootout if a match ended with a draw after 120 minutes, rather than continuing with the former tradition of staging a replay (or even more than one replay, if necessary, as in England). This new practiceintroduced to save on the number of matches to be played -increased the number of shootouts considerably.
Conclusion
Penalty At 53.3%, the average winning probability of first-kicking teams is above the a priori probability of 50%, although the difference is not significant. The small effect away from the a priori probability is mainly driven by the Spanish tournament. One can only speculate on whether a first-mover advantage would become significant or whether one would even obtain evidence for a second-mover advantage if one were able to collect data on the kicking order of many more shootouts in many more tournaments. Obviously, with very large numbers of observations, even tiny differences can become significant in either direction. However, tiny differences, even if significant, call the economic relevance of underlying effects into question. Given the evidence provided in this paper and in recent working papers based on different approaches, we are confident in concluding that psychological pressure, if present in penalty shootouts and, more generally, in many dynamic tournaments, does not seem to influence overall actual winning probabilities in a symmetric sequential tournament with an a priori winning probability of 50%. Consequently, there does not seem to be inherent unfairness created by the order of moves in dynamic sports tournaments. Nevertheless, there is still room for much more research: the role of effort costs in the tournament, the role of disappointment and reference points (see, e.g., Gill and Prowse, forthcoming), and the relationship of psychological effects with the actual dynamics in a sequential tournament call for much more empirical (experimental) evidence. Ionescu (2003, 2004c, 2004d Notes: ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level, robust standard errors in parentheses (clustering at the level of the shootout-ID).
Using logit regressions instead of probit does not change the results qualitatively. 
